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A Renewed Political Deal for Sustainable 
Growth within the Eurozone and the EU 
An open letter to the President of the European Council 
Giuliano Amato, Richard Baldwin, Daniel Gros, 
Stefano Micossi & Pier Carlo Padoan 
Dear Mr Van Rompuy, 
At its forthcoming December meeting, the European Council will deliberate on new rules of 
economic governance. We fear, however, that the proposals under consideration are not a 
sufficient cure for the economic plight of the Union since they will not resolve the competitive 
and payment imbalances that are undermining the credibility of the budgetary consolidation 
programmes and the euro itself. There is an urgent need to lift the growth rate of the Union, and 
budgetary consolidation, as important as it is, will not suffice.  
In this Policy Brief, we have tried to outline the elements of a comprehensive economic policy 
initiative at the EU level capable of matching fiscal discipline with higher growth, as well as 
restoring a climate of cooperation between the Member States. We hope that you will consider 
bringing our proposals to the attention of the European Council. 
 
nder current policies, the European Union will 
only be able to pull itself out of low growth 
and high unemployment very slowly – too 
slowly to exclude dangerous economic and political 
assaults on the Union’s continuing cohesion and 
viability. What is needed is a substantial increase in the 
EU output growth rate, which has been persistently 
low for too long a time. With low growth, sovereign 
debt sustainability in a number of member states will 
remain uncertain, possibly leading to renewed strains 
in financial markets and rising spreads that will 
aggravate the costs of budgetary consolidation. The 
divergences in productivity and competitiveness and 
the current external imbalances they engendered can 
be unwound at an acceptable cost only if growth 
accelerates in the core and the periphery. On present 
trends, the adjustment burden might be unbearable for 
peripheral countries and generate strains that may 
eventually undermine the euro. 
U 
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The Union is right in seeking sustainable correction of 
fiscal imbalances, which seriously threaten not only 
the viability of the euro but also long-term growth 
prospects. Concrete proposals for important 
improvements in the economic governance of the 
eurozone and the Union to help restore sound fiscal 
policies and consolidate excessive budgetary 
imbalances have already been tabled by the European 
Commission. However, insufficient attention has been 
devoted to policies capable of raising actual and 
potential growth rates and correcting competitive 
imbalances.  
The European Union needs a comprehensive political 
deal not only to stabilise financial markets and tackle 
its widening internal competitive imbalances, but also 
to raise growth on a sustainable basis. We present 
below the main pillars of this comprehensive deal 
whose central component must be a decisive 
commitment to re-launch economic integration and 
push back protectionism and populist policies 
undermining the Union.  
1. Fiscal  consolidation 
The European Council and Ecofin have already 
outlined the main elements of fiscal discipline and 
adjustment policies to restore sustainable sovereign 
debt positions, notably including sustained reductions 
of the debt-to-GDP ratios underpinned by operational 
and verifiable quantitative commitments.  
A critical aspect that requires stronger tools in this 
context is the quality of consolidation programmes, to 
be centred much more than in the past on permanently 
lower growth of current public expenditures, based on 
efficiency and growth-enhancing reform of 
entitlements (pensions) and unemployment support 
schemes (active labour market policies). These steps 
would be supplemented by measures aimed at 
increasing efficiency in public spending so as to 
enhance the growth-friendly components of fiscal 
consolidation. An appropriate strengthening of relevant 
provisions in the SGP legislative texts before Council 
and Parliament seems in order.  
Furthermore, the public debate has placed too much 
emphasis on the ‘corrective’ arm of the reformed 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), i.e. sanctions for 
non-compliance in the excessive deficit procedure. In 
any event, that option will always come too late and 
will be hardly affordable by countries running off-
track.  
Instead, greater weight should be placed on 
strengthening the ‘preventive’ arm of the Pact, which 
is really where policy coordination within Ecofin and 
the European Council failed. To this end, the European 
Commission’s powers to publish league tables of 
performance, launch early warnings and make public 
its analyses and recommendations on divergent 
countries should not be subject to Council approval; 
and reverse voting in the Council on Commission 
recommendations on how to deal with divergent 
countries should apply across the board. Full publicity 
should always be given to Council deliberations. 
Policy coordination will benefit from the ‘European 
Semester’,  a six-month cycle of economic policy 
coordination to be launched as from next year, and 
associated enhanced surveillance over national policy 
programmes, but this will require effective 
implementation to be seriously assessed on a regular 
basis, not just paid lip service. The new powers 
granted to Eurostat should establish stronger 
safeguards against ‘cooking up’ the public sector and 
national accounts. Both innovations are welcome. 
They should be matched by national rules preventing 
all interference by governments in national statistical 
agencies – a still quite common practice in many 
eurozone members. 
The most important elements to underpin the reformed 
SGP are the envisaged changes in national fiscal 
institutions and procedures, which should be made 
legally binding at EU level. Prominent among them is 
the establishment in all member states of an 
independent fiscal authority, accountable to 
Parliaments and entrusted with the task of publicly 
assessing the state of accounts and the quality of 
national consolidation programmes. Their scrutiny 
should explicitly cover compliance of national 
budgetary policies with common goals agreed within 
the European Council and Ecofin, and be made public. 
Their assessment and recommendations should play a 
prominent role in budgetary deliberations by national 
Parliaments, with a requirement that all decisions not 
complying with EU recommendations be explicitly 
justified and notified to competent EU institutions. 
2. Crisis  management 
A stronger framework for budgetary and 
macroeconomic stability to prevent the build-up of 
unsustainable private debt will reduce the likelihood of 
future crises, but even the strongest framework will 
occasionally fail and the present crisis is likely to drag 
on for quite some time. The EU thus needs a 
framework for dealing with a crisis in a member state 
that may threaten the stability of the euro. 
The key to making crisis manageable is a strong 
financial system that is able to withstand systemic 
shocks. A variety of measures should be used to 
strengthen market discipline. For one thing, 
intermediaries and institutional investors should be 
required by supervisors to pay adequate attention to the 
Commission’s warnings on the sustainability of 
sovereign obligations of eurozone members. Rules 
limiting excessive credit expansion and risk-taking by 
financial intermediaries will also affect their 
willingness to finance risky sovereign debtors. Critical  
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in this respect is a credible promise, in the event that 
one member state becomes insolvent, not to intervene 
to relieve its creditors. Careless lending to some 
member states by core euro-area banks, despite their 
worsening fundamentals, indicates that they expected 
to be bailed out at no cost in case of insolvency. The 
key issue then becomes how to lend sufficient 
credibility to the no-bail-out clause vis-à-vis the 
member states and financial markets. 
Such a promise must be founded on two pillars.  
The first pillar is new banking rules making it possible 
for any bank, including large cross-border banks, to 
fail and thus not reimburse fully their creditors and 
equity holders – with the sole exception of insured 
(retail) depositors.
1 Such a system would introduce 
strong incentives for bank managers and equity holders 
to limit risk-taking and create much more stringent 
market discipline also extending to sovereign 
borrowers. A good start would be to make it adamantly 
clear that banks will have to bear the losses still hidden 
in their balance sheets and government deficits will not 
be swollen even more to bail out their creditors.    
The second pillar is a European Monetary Fund (EMF) 
– the permanent continuation of the present European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which has now 
been endorsed by the European Council – endowed 
with sufficient capital and access to market financing 
to protect the euro and the Union’s financial system 
from the fall-out of a sovereign debt crisis. Its mandate 
should not include covering losses of public and 
private insolvencies. 
Its principal task should be to cushion systemic 
financial shocks and keep them from turning into fully-
fledged runs on depository financial institutions, thus 
preserving confidence. It could lend to the member 
states, with reimbursement of the loan taking priority 
over all outstanding debt and strong conditionality – 
but never bail out their creditor banks, as was clearly 
the goal with the Greek interventions last May. And it 
could similarly help manage the resolution of large 
cross-border banks, e.g. as suggested by the 
Commission by providing capital to bridge banks 
emerging from the liquidation, while leaving equity 
holders and creditors to bear full residual losses. 
3.  Structural reforms for sustained 
growth 
Two main features stand out in Europe’s economic 
performance: low productivity growth and low growth 
of domestic demand, mainly reflecting the evolution of 
                                                      
1 For a full description of a feasible bank crisis resolution 
mechanism, see Overcoming too big to fail: A regulatory 
framework to limit moral hazard and free riding in the 
financial sector, by J. Carmassi, E. Luchetti and S. Micossi, 
CEPS, Brussels, March 2010. 
labour incomes. Productivity growth has slowed down 
in a number of EU countries, although at different 
speeds and reflecting different efforts at structural 
policies and innovation. In cases where these have 
succeeded in enhancing productivity in the 
manufacturing sector, they have allowed some core 
countries to benefit from a buoyant demand by 
emerging economies for investment goods, letting 
them climb back more quickly from the recession in 
the current (slow) recovery phase. However, both the 
core and periphery suffer from low growth in 
productivity in services. Even in Germany, during the 
past decade, domestic demand has barely increased 
and real wages have stagnated. While the low growth 
of German GDP was mainly a result of the stagnation 
of the working age population in Germany, the country 
would have benefitted from a more dynamic service 
sector and its contribution to the rest of the eurozone 
would then have been much more positive. 
Policies for public sector consolidation will strengthen 
financial stability and improve incentives for private 
investment. However, positive effects on confidence 
will kick in only in the medium term and to the extent 
that announced policies are credible. In the short term 
consolidation will have a negative impact on demand, 
compounded by the simultaneous budgetary 
restrictions in all the eurozone member states – albeit 
some analyses indicate that such effects may be 
limited.  
Europe cannot return to sustained growth without 
durably raising the rate of growth of domestic incomes 
and domestic demand. While demographic factors 
weigh importantly on long-term growth potential, one 
should not underestimate the strong impact on 
productivity from innovation and innovation-related 
investment notably in intangible assets. OECD data 
show that in the decade 1996-2006, more than two-
thirds of productivity growth came from these sources 
in advanced economies. Stronger productivity growth 
can lead to increased household demand through 
higher wages. However this must be achieved without 
weakening competitiveness and taking into account the 
need to rebalance current external payments within 
Europe and the eurozone. 
To this effect a much stronger role must be played by 
structural reforms. There is a need for labour market 
reforms aimed at increasing flexibility that would 
allow real wages to respond more efficiently to 
competitive pressures. Increasing employment rates 
among women and youth can add significantly to the 
labour force and strengthen potential output. Most of 
all, service sector liberalisation can boost investment 
including in countries where current account surpluses 
reflect a low level of investment with respect to 
savings, thus addressing the structural determinants of 
external payment imbalances.  
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We have been at this point before. At the start of the 
last decade, Europe’s economy had to digest the 
aftermath of another financial boom and bust – the dot-
com bubble – and the psychological shock of the 9/11 
attacks. The recovery was slow and relied mainly on 
massive credit expansion pushing demand in the 
periphery beyond sustainable limits; the Stability Pact 
was made less stringent when it suited the core. Too 
little was done to support the supply side: the Lisbon 
agenda was largely ignored and the Services Directive 
was carefully tailored to tame its liberalising potential. 
Timidity in structural reform of services has played a 
crucial role in depressing growth and employment 
since services represent well over two-thirds of our 
economies and are plagued by massive inefficiencies 
due to barriers to entry and corporatist protections. A 
wealth of studies has confirmed over and over again 
that this is where the productivity and income gaps 
relative to the United States mainly arise. By opening 
the services sector to competition we would create 
enormous opportunities for domestic investment and 
productivity increases, which would translate into 
higher domestic incomes, as well as indirectly 
strengthen our industry with lower-cost and higher-
quality services. 
In retail distribution, transport, construction, financial 
and professional services, the Union trails far behind: 
therefore, this is where we should concentrate our 
efforts of reform. In all these areas, while many a 
country is lagging behind, we have within the Union 
best practices that have produced world leaders and 
enormous productivity increases.
2 Thus, we could 
copy the Swedish retail revolution, German and Dutch 
road transport efficiency and the UK’s successes in 
reducing fragmentation and improving project quality 
in the construction industry. And banks should no 
longer be allowed to delay recapitalisation and loss 
recognition, which is a major factor holding down the 
supply of credit and the recovery of the housing sector. 
Critical in this context is the liberalisation and full 
integration of energy markets, still fragmented into 
closed national gardens and controlled by national 
monopolists reaping hefty rents by imposing very high 
costs on industry and consumers.    
Last but not least, service sector liberalisation is 
instrumental to enhancing the impact of innovation and 
innovation diffusion, hence amplifying productivity 
growth. In order to maximise innovation benefits, 
Council and Parliament should finally break the 
deadlock on the European patent. 
                                                      
2 See the recent study by McKinsey Global Institute, Beyond 
Austerity: A path to economic growth and renewal in 
Europe, October 2010. 
In his Report “A new strategy for the Single Market”, 
Professor Mario Monti offers the complete list of 
regulatory changes that would cut the chains holding 
down Europe’s growth and denying all improvement 
in living standards of our working population. Fast-
track procedures for their transposition into Union law 
would bring rapid benefits and entirely change the dire 
economic climate throughout the Union.
3 
We urgently need a revolution in services regulation. 
There are gigantic rewards waiting to be reaped, if 
only we can summon up the imagination to envisage 
them and the political will to pursue them with 
determination and continuity. 
4.  Investing in infrastructures for the 
internal market 
“It is impossible to imagine a Single Market without 
the physical infrastructure connecting its parts: roads 
and transport connections, electricity grids, electronic 
communications and water networks. Infrastructure is 
vital for ensuring the mobility that underpins a 
functioning integrated market and for promoting 
growth and sustainable development. They are key to 
ensuring territorial cohesion. Despite the recognition 
of the importance of the infrastructure dimension of 
the single market … a range of obstacles still prevent 
us from thinking European in this area”.
4   
There is little question that a substantial increase in 
investments for the single market infrastructures would 
bring great benefits by boosting demand in the short 
term and by raising the Union’s potential output in the 
long term. The obstacles to overcome are two-fold: the 
planning and selection process and the financing 
means.    
As to the planning and selection process, notably 
within the TENs (trans-European networks) 
framework, the member states have displayed great 
dexterity in gaining support for national priorities, but 
much less in agreeing on the required concentration of 
efforts in cross-border projects effective for removing 
cross-border bottlenecks in energy, transport and 
communications and creating the integrated open 
playing field that is needed for the internal market to 
function. The scanty available means have been 
deployed to a ludicrous number of projects.  
A new start is needed, able to identify a new list of 
priorities and projects, strictly and rigorously aimed at 
removing obstacles and laying the groundwork to a 
functioning single market. To this end, effective 
                                                      
3 “A new strategy for the Single Market – at the service of 
Europe’s economy and society”, Report to the President of 
the European Commission José Manuel Barroso by Mario 
Monti, May 2010. 
4 Ibid.  
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criteria of economic value added and long-term 
profitability should be strictly enforced. The initiative 
can only be taken by the Commission; but Parliament 
can play a useful stimulus and monitoring role – if 
only it can overcome pressures to lend its support to 
petty projects of no value sponsored by local 
constituencies and interest groups. All projects should 
be validated by the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), which should also be entrusted 
with their implementation – thus barring all national 
interference and ensuring maximum value for money. 
The very low level of real interest rates strengthens the 
case for public infrastructure investment in general. 
Given that low interest rates are likely to persist for 
some time, many projects that were not economically 
viable could now be financed at market terms.  
As to financing, there is a need to mobilise major 
resources, to a scale unseen so far. As suggested by the 
Monti report, this requires exploring new combinations 
between private and private funding, based on 
innovative techniques for awarding contracts that are 
able to offer long-term private investors appropriate 
rewards. Structural funds may be mobilised in this 
context to reduce risks to private investors and paying 
a fair share for public benefits that cannot be 
monetised. Significant resources could be freed by the 
development in Europe of a liquid bond market for 
very long maturities: a development that would be 
facilitated by substantial issuance of Union bonds by 
these development banks, the EMF and other 
Community institutions. 
In this context, the issuance of Union bonds should not 
be seen as a way to redistribute resources between the 
member states, but only as a way to ensure ample 
finance at the lowest possible cost for  critical 
infrastructures. 
At a time when the public finances of some peripheral 
member countries are under intense stress, it might 
seem paradoxical to support an end to unlimited bail-
outs and propose at the same time new Union financial 
instruments which have to be backed by everybody. 
However, the Union bonds we have in mind would not 
create hidden excess liabilities for the fiscally stronger 
member states because contributions to the EU budget 
(a supra-national body) are senior to the claims of 
holders of national public debt.   Moreover, these 
Union bonds could also be backed by real guarantees, 
namely the returns from the projects to be financed, 
thus transforming them de facto into some sort of 
covered bonds with a double guarantee. 
But most of all there is a need for a political decision 
to strengthen dramatically the Union’s specialised 
financial institutions – the EIB and the EBRD – which 
over time could usefully merge into one large-size 
infrastructure and development bank, adequately 
capitalised to be a credible and attractive counterpart to 
sovereign and institutional investors worldwide.   
Gearing up public sector infrastructure spending in a 
sensible way will take time: it is not meant to provide a 
quick fix to the current lack of demand, but rather to 
strengthen growth prospects over the medium term. 
However, a strong commitment in this direction would 
play a major role even in the short term in improving 
investors’ expectations and mobilising private 
investment in complementary projects and project co-
financing.  
5.  Playing ball in international policy 
coordination 
The initial response to the financial crisis by the major 
countries and economic regions was effective in 
avoiding a financial meltdown and freefall of output. 
Afterwards, however, cooperation has faltered, leaving 
room for uncoordinated policies to emerge that raise 
fears of renewed instability and do not seem able to 
restore sustained growth and reabsorb high 
unemployment. 
In Seoul the G20 has reached limited agreement to 
‘monitor imbalances’, which is a step forward but no 
panacea. As fiscal and monetary policy spaces are 
narrowing in the advanced economies, increasingly 
abundant liquidity creation coupled with less than 
adequate exchange rate flexibility risk aggravating 
distortions and disequilibria without providing durable 
solutions to lagging demand and persistent 
unemployment, especially in the United States.  
Together with a number of emerging economies with 
flexible exchange rates, Europe is bearing the negative 
consequences of these policies as the euro rises too 
high and weakens further an already anaemic 
economic system. A new deal on economic policies at 
the international level should start by recognising the 
obvious, i.e. that not every economy can export itself 
out of the recession and that sustained growth 
necessarily requires a more balanced growth across 
countries and regions. The G20 approach is based on 
the idea of a reasonable division of labour among large 
countries using all available policy tools, including 
macroeconomic, exchange and structural policies. IMF 
and OECD simulations have shown that this would 
lead to a superior outcome in terms of higher growth, 
effective fiscal consolidation and smaller global 
imbalances including within the euro area. 
On this score, we should acknowledge that China is 
doing a lot to help world growth, with very rapid 
growth of its domestic demand. Appreciation of the 
yuan is necessary but it needs to be carefully 
sequenced and accompanied by structural measures to 
deal with very large savings in both the household and 
corporate sectors.   
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In this context the European Union must recognise its 
responsibility to increase domestic demand and 
contribute to help support a balanced world growth.   
Europe in general and the eurozone in particular have 
little voice, or rather too many voices in global fora. 
The recent agreement on reducing the number of 
European representatives on the Board of the IMF goes 
in the wrong direction as it disperses euro-area country 
representation over a number of different 
constituencies comprising also other countries with 
quite different economic structures and interests. The 
real option is a single euro-area seat. However, lacking 
a Union proposal, this was not even discussed and has 
become more difficult to achieve as a result of these 
changes. 
6.  In conclusion 
The economic and financial situation of the European 
Union risks once again entering acute instability, and 
the economic recipes under discussion in the European 
Council are not adequate to restore sustained growth 
nor, as a consequence, to ensure sovereign debt 
sustainability and financial stability. Nor can we 
expect to be lifted out of the present dire straits by net 
demand from other countries and regions of the world.  
Debt sustainability can only be founded on sustained 
growth of our economies. Exclusive emphasis on 
restoring sound public finances will not suffice. A 
broader political deal on economic policies and 
economic governance is needed to lift growth and 
restore confidence in the future of the eurozone and the 
Union. This requires agreeing on well-identified policy 
priorities both at EU and member state level, taking 
full account of the different positions of the members 
in terms of growth, external imbalances and 
competitiveness.  
Such a deal must include, together with better-
designed measures for fiscal discipline, a decisive 
drive to accelerate the completion of the single market 
and strong investment in cross-border infrastructures. 
Structural reforms can and should be designed and 
implemented to reflect national priorities, but also to 
recognise the contribution that national policies can 
bring to raising growth durably and helping reabsorb 
competitive and payment imbalances that threaten the 
long-term viability of the euro. Related CEPS Publications 
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